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Abstract: 
On 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt) issued its decision 
on, inter alia, whether Northern Ireland‟s near-total abortion ban was compatible with 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This article critically assesses the 
UKSC‟s treatment of international law in this case. It argues that the UKSCt was 
justified in finding that Northern Ireland‟s ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and 
FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 
ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Northern Ireland has one of the strictest abortion frameworks in the world. Abortion is 
prohibited unless there is a risk to the life of the mother or a risk of serious long-term or 
permanent injury to her physical or mental health.1 This amounts to a near-total ban on 
abortion, including in cases of rape, incest, fatal fetal abnormality (FFA), and serious 
fetal abnormality.2 It also contrasts starkly to the applicable legal framework in England, 
Wales and Scotland where abortion has been legally available since 1967, and 
exemplifies Northern Ireland‟s devolved legislative powers.3 On 7 June 2018, the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt), issued its decision on two contentious 
issues: (i) whether Northern Ireland‟s abortion law was compatible with the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR); and (ii) whether the Northern Ireland Human 
                                                
1
 The applicable law is sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and section 
25(1) of the Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1945. The Abortion Act 1967 does not extend to Northern Ireland. 
2
 FFA is where the fetus is likely to die before birth or shortly after, whereas serious fetal abnormality is an 
abnormality which is serious but not immediately life threatening per se. 
3 J Thomson, Explaining gender equality difference in a devolved system: The case of abortion law in 
Northern Ireland (2016) 11(3) Politics, Languages & International Studies 371. 
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Rights Commission (NIHRC) had standing to bring such proceedings.4 This was the first 
time the UKSCt has considered the substantive compatibility of restrictions on abortion 
in Northern Ireland with the ECHR.5 The NIHRC brought the challenge by presenting 
four scenarios, rather than identifiable complainants, arguing that denial of abortion to 
women in Northern Ireland generally in cases of rape, serious fetal abnormality, FFA, 
and pregnancy as a result of rape and incest violated Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR. The 
UKSCt held that the NIHRC did not have standing and accordingly that the UKSCt had 
no jurisdiction to make a declaration of incompatibility with the ECHR.6 Nonetheless, the 
judges gave their views on how they would have decided if the UKSCt were able to 
make such a declaration.7  
 
The majority (Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, and Lady Hale) found that 
Northern Ireland‟s abortion law violated Article 8 of the ECHR (the right to respect for 
private and family life) insofar as it prohibits abortion in cases of rape, incest and FFA,8 
but not in cases of serious fetal abnormality.9 Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson also held that 
Northern Ireland‟s abortion law violated the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, guaranteed by Article 3 ECHR.10  
 
Although the primary substantive issue before the UKSCt was the relationship 
between Northern Irish law and the ECHR, the majority noted that the ECHR must be 
interpreted in light of other international treaties to which the UK is a party.11 This article 
will critically assess whether this goal was achieved. It will argue that the UKSCt was 
justified in finding that Northern Ireland‟s ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and 
FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 
ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally. We argue that the 
                                                
4
 In the Matter of an Application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review 
(Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27. 
5  In 2017 the UKSCt considered whether funding for travel for abortion services should be provided to 
women in Norther Ireland, R (on the application of A and B)  v Secretary of State for Health [2017] UKSC 
41. 
6
 A declaration of incompatibility was sought under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
7
 Although the appropriateness of making obiter comments of this nature may be questioned, this issue is 
outside the scope of this article. 
8
 Lady Black agreed with this holding in cases of FFA. 
9
 Lord Mance, Hale, and Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed). Lord Reed (with whom Lord Lloyd 
Jones agreed) did not find any violations of Art 8 and instead would leave this as an issue for Parliament. 
Lady Black agreed with Lord Reed in cases other than FFA.  
10
 Lord Reed and Lord Lloyd-Jones held that the law is not incompatible with either Art 8 or Art 3. 
11
 Lady Hale para 5; Lord Mance, para 101; Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed) para 328. The UK 
is a party to the following treaties which were relevant to the subject matter before the UKSCt: 1984 
Convention against Torture 1465 UNTS 85; 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights; 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171; 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3; 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women 1249 UNTS 13; 2008 Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 2515 UNTS 3. 
   
 
   
 
3 
UKSCt should have identified that the jurisprudence of the ECHR on Article 3 has 
broadened in recent years and thus the UKSCt should have found that Northern 
Ireland‟s near-total ban on abortion was a violation of Article 3. We also show that 
although non-binding, there are persuasive reasons why the UN Human Rights 
Committee‟s (HRC)12 views should have been taken into account by the UKSCt in 
interpreting the scope of Article 3 ECHR. We therefore argue that by not finding a 
violation of Article 3 at least in cases of incest, rape, and FFA, the UKSCt missed a 
valuable opportunity to give a full reflection of the incompatibility of Northern Ireland‟s 
abortion law with the ECHR and with international law.  
 
This piece is the first to analyse the UKSCt‟s treatment of international law in this 
case, and the arguments made are significant for three main reasons. First, in its 
decision, the UKSCt explicitly stated that should an individual who is a victim of rape, 
incest, or whose pregnancy has a FFA take a future case challenging Northern Ireland‟s 
abortion law, the Court would likely find in their favour. As such, the UKSCt has invited 
future litigation on this issue. When these cases come before the courts, the previous 
views of the UKSCt on the relationship between Northern Ireland‟s abortion legislation 
with the ECHR will not be binding but rather of persuasive authority only. This is 
because the views of the UKSCt in this respect were obiter. Thus, in future cases, a 
court will be free to make its own determination on the relationship between the ECHR 
and Northern Ireland‟s abortion law. In doing so, it is hoped that our analysis on the 
scope of Article 8 ECHR and on the applicability of Article 3 ECHR in this context could 
be of use to both courts and advocates.  
 
Secondly, we argue that applicants in such circumstances should be encouraged 
to bring challenges based on Article 3, and that court considering future challenges 
should go further than the UKSCt and find a violation of Article 3 and Article 8  (instead 
of simply a violation of Article 8). Finding a violation of both Article 3 and Article 8 is 
significant because a violation of Article 3 is one of the most serious human rights 
violations, evident by the fact that it is an absolute right with no margin of appreciation.13 
Such a finding would add greater pressure for Northern Ireland to engage in legislative 
change in this area. This is important because even if a declaration of incompatibility is 
                                                
12
 The HRC is a quasi-judicial international committee of independent experts that monitors the 
implementation of the ICCPR by its States Parties. The HRC was established by Art 28 of the ICCPR. It 
can receive communications from individuals against States Parties to the First Optional Protocol 
(pursuant to Art 1 of Optional Protocol 1) and the HRC can forward its „views‟ to the State Party 
concerned and to the individual. These views are not binding.  However, as the members of the HRC are 
experts in international law, and as they are interpreting the ICCPR itself, their views are highly 
persuasive and are seen as authoritative interpretations of the ICCPR. Art 38(1)(d) of the Charter of the 
United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice 1 UNTS 16 also provides that the views of 
experts are a subsidiary source of international law. 
13
 See section III. 
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made under UK law there is no legal obligation on the Government to take remedial 
action, and the decision as to whether the laws are changed rests with Parliament.14 A 
further difficulty in this context is that the Northern Ireland Assembly is currently 
suspended, thus there is no way for Northern Ireland to reform its abortion laws until the 
Assembly comes back into operation.15 If the UKSCt were to find a breach of Article 3 
alongside Article 8 ECHR, this would put the Northern Ireland Assembly under more 
pressure to resolve the Assembly and once resolved, to amend Northern Ireland‟s 
abortion laws. Moreover, it is envisaged that the arguments in this piece can provide 
guidance for legislators in Northern Ireland should they decide to change the law. 
 
Finally, Lord Kerr noted that he would not engage with the views of the HRC 
because „the status of those decisions and their relevance in domestic proceedings…. 
are far from straightforward subjects.‟16 This article clarifies the relationship between 
international law and domestic law, and should thus be of guidance for a court or 
advocates wishing to draw on international law as a persuasive source in future cases. 
  
The article will proceed as follows. Section II will show why the suffering experienced 
by women denied abortions in cases of FFA, rape and incest should be recognised as 
human rights violations. Sections III and IV will focus on the UKSCt‟s treatment of 
Article 8 and 3 ECHR, respectively. Section V will examine the UKSCt‟s treatment of 
international law more generally, and section VI will conclude. 
 
II. DENIAL OF ABORTION ACCESS AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION  
 
There is consensus in literature that the denial of abortion entails significant hardship 
and suffering, particularly where abortion is heavily restricted and where attempting to 
access abortion for any reason is highly stigmatized.17  Denial of abortion is seen by 
                                                
14
 Ministry for Justice, Responding to Human Rights judgments, Report to the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights on the Government‟s response to Human Rights judgments 2016 17 (December 2017) available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/66944
9/responding__to_human_rights_judgments_2016-17-print.pdf p. 4-5 
15
 „UK government calls for Northern Ireland to consider abortion reforms‟ (5
th
 June 2018) RTE News 
available at https://www.rte.ie/news/uk/2018/0605/968195-oapa/  A last resort would be to encourage the 
UK Parliament to repeal relevant sections of the OAPA. This would make abortion illegal and force the 
Northern Ireland Assembly to act. See https://www.thejournal.ie/uk-debate-abortion-northern-ireland-
4053119-Jun2018/ 
16
 Para 330. 
17
 A Zureick, „(En)gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment‟ (2015) 38(1) Fordham International Law Journal 99; K McNeilly, C Pierson, and F Bloomer 
(2016), „Moving Forward From Judicial Review on Abortion in Situations of Fatal Foetal Abnormality and 
Sexual Crime: The Experience of Health Professionals. Queen's University Belfast at 6; F Bloomer, F and 
Hoggart, L (2016) Abortion Policy - Challenges and Opportunities. Briefing Paper, Knowledge Exchange 
Seminar Series. RAISE/ NI Assembly; Abortion Worldwide: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access‟ 
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many as a violation of pregnant woman‟s right to autonomy, self-determination, and 
bodily integrity.18 As Margaret Olivia Little argues:  
 
„To be pregnant is to be inhabited. It is to be occupied. It is to be in a state of 
physical intimacy of a particularly thorough-going nature. The fetus intrudes 
on the body massively; whatever medical risks one faces or avoids, the brute 
fact remains that the fetus shifts and alters the very physical boundaries of 
the woman‟s self.‟19 
 
Refusing an abortion to a woman who requests one forces her to continue the 
pregnancy, entails significant physical changes to her body, creates potential medical 
risks, and fundamentally challenges her bodily autonomy. For these reasons, some 
argue that abortions should be made available to all women who request them and that 
a distinction between particular categories such as FFA etc should not be drawn.20 We 
agree with this position, but we accept that at the time of writing, international law only 
recognizes a right to abortion in in cases of FFA, and where the pregnancy is a result of 
rape or incest.21  
 
There are good reasons why international law recognizes that States must provide 
abortion access in these exceptional circumstances. The three options facing such 
women– terminating the pregnancy illegally, travelling abroad to terminate the 
pregnancy, or being forced to carry the pregnancy to term – can further exacerbate their 
severe suffering and humiliation contingent from their circumstances. The first option – 
procuring an illegal abortion (for example, by purchasing pills on the internet) – could 
expose such a woman to risks to her life and/or health as it would be carried out without 
medical supervision.22 She is likely to fear seeking counselling and/or aftercare if there 
are any complications. She would also have to undertake the risks of criminal charges 
                                                                                                                                                          
(2017) Guttamacher Institute https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/abortion-worldwide-
2017.pdf. 
18 J Jarvis Thomson, „A defence of abortion‟ (1971) 1 Philospohy and Public Affaors 47; E Jackson, 
„Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis‟ (2000) 9(4) Social & Legal Studies 467–494; E 
Jackson,‟Abortion: medical paternalism or patient autonomy?‟ in: E Lee (ed.) Abortion: Whose Right? 
Debating matters. (Hodder and Stoughton, London, UK, 2002); S Sheldon, „The Decriminalisation of 
Abortion: An Argument for Modernisation‟ (2016) 36(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 334–365. 
19 MO Little, „ Abortion, intimacy and the duty to gestate‟ (1999) 2 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 295-
311. 
20 IG Cohen, Are all abortions equal? Should there be exceptions to the criminalization of abortion for 
rape and incest? (2015) 43(1) Journal of Medical Ethics 87; S Sheldon and S Wilkinson, „Termination of 
Pregnancy for Reason of Foetal Disability: Are There Grounds for a Special Exemption in Law?‟ (2001) 9 
Medical Law Review 85. 
21 A Zureick, „(En)gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment‟ (2015) 38(1) Fordham International Law Journal 99. 
22 „Abortion Worldwide: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access‟ (2017) Guttamacher Institute 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/abortion-worldwide-2017.pdf  28- 33. 
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being brought against her,23 and the corresponding lack of information available and 
stigma associated with carrying out an illegal act. The second option – procuring an 
abortion abroad – could result in significant cost and difficulties in securing time off from 
employment and/or caring responsibilities. She would have to undergo an invasive 
medical procedure in a foreign environment, possibly without a support structure; and 
may have to leave the fetus‟ remains behind and secure transport of the remains at 
additional costs/stress.24 Similarly, she is likely to suffer the stigma associated with the 
criminalisation of abortion, and the consequent lack of information, counselling and/or 
aftercare. The third option of carrying a pregnancy to term against her will would also 
likely result in „intense physical and mental suffering‟.25 Those whose pregnancies have 
a FFA would have to carry the pregnancy to term knowing the fetus would not survive. 
This could make the pregnancy more traumatic and because the fetus will die either 
before or shortly after birth, trying to vindicate the life of the fetus is futile.26 Where the 
pregnancy is a result of rape, prohibiting abortion is likely to exacerbate suffering for 
women denied an abortion as the pregnancy and the potential child may act as a 
reminder of the rape.27  In cases of incest, it would be „plainly humiliating‟28 to require a 
woman to continue a pregnancy that she considers „abhorrent‟29 to term.   
                                                
23 Abortion is a criminal offence in Northern Ireland under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861, punishable by up to life imprisonment. Women procuring an abortion and those who 
assist them are potentially criminally responsible. 
24 K McNeilly, C Pierson, and F Bloomer,  „Moving Forward From Judicial Review on Abortion in 
Situations of Fatal Foetal Abnormality and Sexual Crime: The Experience of Health Professionals. 
(Queen‟s University Belfast, 2016) 6 available at 
https://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/files/127528554/HealthcareProfessionalsRoundtableReport_090916.pdf ; F 
Bloomer, and L Hoggart,  „Briefing Paper, Knowledge Exchange Seminar Series -Abortion Policy - 
Challenges and Opportunities‟ (RAISE/ Norther Ireland Assembly, 2016)  available at 
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/knowledge_exchange/briefing_papers/series
5/dr-bloomer-and-dr-hoggart-version-2.pdf  
25
 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Woman, „Report of the inquiry concerning the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Art 8 of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women‟ CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1 (19 
July 2017); Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, „Issue Paper: Women‟s sexual and 
reproductive health and rights in Europe‟ (December, 2017) < https://rm.coe.int/women-s-sexual-and-
reproductive-health-and-rights-in-europe-issue-pape/168076dead>; Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for 
Human Rights of the Council of Europe, „Report following his visit to Ireland 22-25 November 2016‟ (27 
March 2017) CommDH (2017), para 91.   
26 F De Londras and M Enright, Reforming Irish Abortion Law (2018), chapter 2; F de Londras, „Fatal 
Fetal Abnormality, Irish Constitutional Law and Mellet v Ireland‟ 24(4) Medical Law Review 591, 595 
(2016), J Schweppe and E Spain, „When is a Foetus not an Unborn? Fatal Foetal Abnormalities and 
Article 40.3.3 3‟ (3) Irish Journal of Legal Studies 92 (2013), E Barrington, „Submission to Citizens‟ 
Assembly, Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution and Fatal Foetal Abnormalities‟ (January 2017) para 3.3, 
available at https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/Meetings/Eileen-Barrington-Paper.pdf.  
27
 See comments of Prof Ruth Halperin-Kaddari in  Press Release of UN Office of the High 
Commissioner, „UK violates women‟s rights in Northern Ireland by unduly restricting access to abortion – 
UN experts‟ available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22693&LangID=E  
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Furthermore, there is no consensus on where life begins and States are given a 
margin of appreciation under the ECHR regarding the legal status of the fetus.30 Thus 
the ECHR does not preclude granting abortion access and instead it limits the extent to 
which any perceived „right‟ of the fetus can trump the rights of pregnant women.  
 
There are therefore convincing reasons why States are obliged to provide for 
abortion access at least in cases of FFA, rape, and incest. The following sections will 
address whether the UKSCt correctly assessed the compatibility of these international 
law obligations with Northern Ireland‟s restrictive abortion framework. 
 
 
  
III. ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR provides that „everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life.‟31 It is common ground that prohibiting abortion is an interference with a 
person‟s private and family life.32 However, the key legal question is whether such 
interference is justified under the terms of Article 8 (2) ECHR as being „in accordance 
with the law and […] necessary in a democratic society […] for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others‟. As noted, the 
majority found Northern Irish law to be in violation of Article 8 but for different reasons 
and with some disagreement over what circumstances would be a violation of Article 8. 
Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lady Hale held that Northern Irish law is 
incompatible with Article 8, insofar as it prohibits abortion in cases of rape, incest and 
FFA; Lady Black agreed with the holding for cases of FFA only; and Lord Reed and 
Lord Lloyd-Jones held that the law is not incompatible with Article 8.  
 
The following key reasons were given by the majority. In respect of FFA the Court 
acknowledged the distress caused to women who are denied abortion access in these 
circumstances. Lady Hale indicated that there was no „community interest in obliging 
                                                                                                                                                          
28
 Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed), para 237. 
29
 Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed), para 242. 
30
 Vo v France (2004) 40 E.H.R.R. 12. See also: Paton v United Kingdom [1981] 3 E.H.R.R. 408; RH v 
Norway (Admissibility) (App. No.17004/90), Eur.Comm.H.R. May 19, 1992; Boso v Italy 
(App.No.50490/99), Eur.Comm.H.R. September 5, 2002. See also, S Palmer, „Abortion and human rights‟ 
(2014) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 596; R Scott, „The English Fetus and the Right to Life‟ 
(2004), European Journal of Health Law, 11(4), 347-364. 
31
 Art 8(2) provides that there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
32
 Lady Hale, para 19. 
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the woman to carry the pregnancy to term if she does not wish to do so. There is no 
viable life to protect.’33 Lord Mance and Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed) 
stated that denying abortion in such cases was disproportionate to the aim of protecting 
unborn life. Lord Mance noted that the current law forces women to carry a fetus to term 
regardless of the circumstances and this fails to take account of the personal autonomy 
and freedom of women, values which underpins Article 8.34 Similarly Lord Kerr (with 
whom Lord Wilson agreed) stated that:  
Put in stark terms, if the fetus has little hope of survival, can it be said that 
requiring the mother to carry it to term is the least intrusive means of 
achieving the aim of protecting the unborn child who does have a hope of 
survival? Clearly not.35  
 
Lady Black also joined the majority in finding a violation on this ground. She noted 
that where there is a FFA there is no life outside the womb to protect and in her view 
denial of an abortion in such cases is an intrusion upon the autonomy and suffering of 
the pregnant woman which cannot be justified.36 Moreover, FFA is often diagnosed late 
in pregnancy and this makes the process of arranging travel for an abortion even more 
demanding, due to the limited time available.37 
 
The majority (Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lady Hale) concluded that 
denying access to abortion in cases of rape was also a violation of Article 8. Lord 
Mance acknowledged the anguish which may arise from pregnancy following rape, 
which does not end on the birth of the child but continues with potential responsibility for 
that child for life. Causing a woman to become pregnant against her will is a grave 
intrusion on bodily integrity, and Lord Mance stated the law should not further 
perpetuate a woman‟s suffering.38 The fact that a woman could travel outside the 
jurisdiction for an abortion did not justify the prohibition of abortion in such cases.39  
 
The majority also held that denial of abortion in cases of incest was a violation of 
Article 8.40 Lord Mance indicated that many typical cases of abortion arising in cases of 
incest involve exploitative relationships with young or younger female relatives, which 
may often also be as a result of rape. The suffering to a woman is evident and the 
„agony of having to carry a child to birth, and to have a potential responsibility for, and 
lifelong relationship with, the child thereafter, against the mother‟s will, cannot be 
                                                
33
 Lady Hale, para 28. 
34
 Lord Mance, para 125. 
35
 Lord Kerr, para 284. 
36
 Lady Black, para 371. 
37
 Lady Black, para 371. 
38
 Lord Mance, para 127. 
39
 Lord Mance, para 127. 
40
 Lady Hale, Lord Mance, and Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed). 
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justified.‟41 Lady Hale stated that abortion where pregnancy results from rape or incest, 
were situations where the „autonomy rights of the pregnant woman should prevail over 
the community interests in the continuation of pregnancy‟.42 
 
The majority did not find that denial of abortion in cases of serious (as opposed to 
fatal) abnormality was a breach of Article 8.43 Lord Mance stated that a disabled child 
should be treated as having the same worth as a non-disabled child, and noted the 
concerns of the UN Committee on Rights of Persons with Disabilities around providing 
terminations in cases of fetal abnormality.44 
 
We welcome these findings in respect of Article 8 because the approach taken by 
the UKSCt is in line with its obligations under the ECHR. Although the ECtHR has 
generally given deference to States in the abortion context, it has not in any way 
precluded domestic courts from making findings of violations. This is because the 
ECtHR has generally adopted a margin of appreciation for States with strict abortion 
regimes.45 The margin of appreciation refers to the discretion or scope for manoeuvre 
bestowed upon Contracting States of the ECHR in fulfilling their obligations under the 
Convention.46 The rationale for this approach is that in some contexts (particularly 
where no consensus amongst Member States is evident), Contracting States should be 
given leeway because: 
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
requirements as well as on the „necessity‟ of a „restriction‟ or „penalty‟ 
intended to meet them.47 [Emphasis added] 
 
The margin of appreciation for States in relation to Article 8 in cases where 
abortion is prohibited was accepted by the ECtHR in A, B, C v Ireland where the ECtHR 
stated that it is „not possible to find in the legal and social orders of the Contracting 
                                                
41
 Lord Mance, para 132. 
42
 Lady Hale, para 27. 
43
 Lord Mance, Hale, and Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed). Lord Reed with whom Lord Lloyd 
Jones agreed did not find any violations of Art 8 and instead would leave this as an issue for parliament. 
Lady Black agreed with Lord Reed in cases outside of fatal fetal abnormality.  
44
 Lord Mance, para 133. 
45
 See A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032. 
46
 H Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights 
Jurisprudence (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996), 13; See also M R Hutchinson, „The Margin of 
Appreciation in the European Court of Human Rights‟ (1999) 48(3) ICLQ 638, 647; R Nigro, „The Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic Veil‟ 
(2010) 11 HR Rev 531.  
47
Handyside v United Kingdom (Application no. 5493/72) Judgment of 7
th
 December, 1976, para 48. 
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States a uniform European conception of morals including on the question of when life 
begins‟48 and national authorities were held to be best placed to decide upon such 
issues. Accordingly, in finding a violation of Article 8, the UKSCt went beyond the usual 
reluctance of the ECtHR to find a violation of this right in the abortion context.49 
However, this article argues that in doing so the UKSCt‟s position nonetheless conforms 
with that of the ECtHR because the ECtHR has left it open to domestic courts to find a 
violation the Convention in respect of strict abortion regimes. Unlike the ECtHR, a 
national court: 
 
[…] is not constrained by the margin of appreciation, but rather must apply 
Convention rights, and their limitations, as part of domestic law. In doing so 
they can, of course, show judicial deference to the national Parliament or 
executive; but must judge whether the restriction is compatible with the rights 
now contained in domestic law.50 
 
As Gerards states, it would be a misinterpretation of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine if national courts simply automatically translated a wide margin of appreciation 
to deferential judicial review at national level. Instead, national courts have a „shared 
responsibility‟ with the ECtHR and must exercise a supervisory role at a domestic level 
based on the context which arises at the State level.51 It was therefore appropriate for 
the UKSCt to find a violation of Article 8, even though the ECtHR has generally granted 
a margin of appreciation on this issue. Moreover, there is a growing recognition in 
international law of the right to abortion access in cases of rape, incest, FFA and where 
the life of the mother is in danger.52 
                                                
48
 A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032, para 22. 
49
 S Foster, Case Comment: In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission for Judicial Review: abortion - declarations of incompatibility - right to private life - inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment - locus standi - Cov. L.J. 2018, 23(1), 117-122; A Davies, „The 
UKSCt Decision on Abortion in Northern Ireland: A Pyrrhic Defeat?‟ Oxford Human Rights Hub 
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-uk-supreme-court-decision-on-abortion-in-northern-ireland-a-pyrrhic-defeat/ 
50
 S Foster, In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial 
Review: abortion - declarations of incompatibility - right to private life - inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment – locus standi (2018) Coventry Law Journal 117, 121. 
51 JH Gerards, The European Court of Human Rights and the National Courts: Giving Shape to the 
Notion of „Shared Responsibility‟ in JH Gerards & JWA Fleuren (eds.), Implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and of the judgments of the ECtHR in national case law. A comparative 
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52
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IV. ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The majority of the UKSCt did not find that Northern Ireland‟s abortion framework 
breached Article 3 ECHR. Article 3 provides that „no one shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.‟ The ECtHR has held on numerous 
occasions that the alleged ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to fall 
within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this threshold is relative and depends 
on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its 
physical or mental effects and the sex, age and state of health of the victim.53 The 
ECtHR considers treatment to be „inhuman‟ when it was „premeditated, […] applied for 
hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental 
suffering‟.54 Treatment is considered to be „degrading” when it humiliates or debases an 
individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or 
arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual‟s moral 
and physical resistance.55 It may suffice that the victim is humiliated in his or her own 
eyes, even if not in the eyes of others.56 
 
Unlike Article 8, Article 3 ECHR protects an absolute right.57 It must be upheld 
even „in times of war or other public emergency threatening the life of a nation‟.58 No 
margin of appreciation applies, and States cannot justify any limitations or restrictions of 
                                                                                                                                                          
– International and Regional Standards‟ (2008) 8(2) Human Rights Law Review 249. See also: A 
McMahon and B Ní Ghráinne, „After the Eighth: Ireland, Abortion and International Law‟ available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3256317.; and views of Lord Mance, para 118-121. 
53
 Kudła v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECHR, 26 October 2000) para 91. 
54
 Kudła v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000) para 92. 
55
 Kudła v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECHR, 26 October 2000)para 92; Pretty v the United Kingdom App 
no. 2346/02  (ECHR, 29 April 2002) para 52. 
56
 Tyrer v The United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECHR, 15 March 1978) para 32. 
57
 N Mavronicola, „Is the Prohibition Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
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Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights‟ 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 723; D 
Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2002) 242; N Mavronicola, „Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying 
an Absolute Right in a Penal Context‟ (2015) 15(4) Human Rights Law Review 721. For a contrary 
opinion, see S Greer, „Is the Prohibition Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute” in International Human Rights Law? A Reply to Griffin and Mavronicola‟ (2018) 18(2) Human 
Rights Law Review 297; S Greer, „Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment Really „Absolute‟ in International Human Rights Law?‟ (2015) 15(1) Human Rights Law Review 
101; S Greer, „Should Police Threats to Torture Suspects Always be Severely Punished? Reflections on 
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rights falling under this Article.59 Once an act is determined to constitute torture, or 
inhuman, or degrading treatment, States are held to be in violation of the ECHR. 
 
We argue that the UKSCt was correct in finding that the ban of abortion in respect of 
serious fetal abnormality did not violate Article 3. This is because there is no consensus 
under international law at the time of writing on whether there is a right to an abortion in 
such circumstances, a point returned to in part IV. Nonetheless, we argue that the Court 
was incorrect in finding that the prohibition of abortion in cases of rape, FFA, or incest 
did not violate Article 3. In the following paragraphs, we set out six key reasons why the 
UKSCt‟s analysis was lacking in this respect, and make suggestions as to how these 
issues should be dealt with in the likely event of future litigation.  
 
A. Failure to Consider the Effects of the Law in Relation to Article 3 
Lady Hale stated that she had „no doubt‟ that the risk of prosecution of women who had 
an illegal abortion and the fact that many women had to travel to Great Britain to have 
an abortion constituted „treatment‟ of the State for the purposes of Article 3 ECHR. 
None of the judges contested this point. However, many judges found that Northern 
Ireland‟s abortion framework did not violate Article 3 ECHR because not every woman 
who is denied an abortion in the circumstances before the UKSCt (in cases of FFA, or 
the where pregnancy is due to rape or incest) would suffer a violation of Article 3 
ECHR.60 Yet, none of the judges who held that Article 3 was not violated, or who 
refused to rule on this point, considered why the Article 3 threshold was not met. It 
would have been preferable had the judges considered that all women who become 
pregnant as a result of rape or incest, or who have had a diagnosis of FFA and are 
denied access to abortion share certain characteristics which could amount to 
circumstances sufficient to meet the threshold for Article 3 - the suffering of women in 
such cases has been explained above in section II. 
 
It is curious that some of the judges in the majority found the suffering of women in 
the circumstances before the court relevant for the Article 8 analysis, but did not explore 
these circumstances in relation to Article 3. For example, in finding that the ban on 
abortion in cases of rape, FFA, and incest violated Article 8, Lord Mance referred to a 
number of personal stories of women who had been affected by the ban and engaged in 
a detailed examination of their „distressing‟ circumstances.61 He referred to the 
„substantial and „potentially long-term'62 „stress‟,63 „trauma‟,64 „anguish‟,65 and 
                                                
59
 Ireland v United Kingdom App no 5319/71 (ECHR, 1 January 1978). 
60
 Lady Hale para 34; Lord Mance para 102; Lady Black agreed with Lord Mance at para 367. 
61
 Para 74. 
62
 Para 126. 
63
 Para 126. 
64
 Para 126. 
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„psychological injury‟66 suffered by such women, as well as the „stress, indignity, and 
expense,‟67 of arranging for an abortion elsewhere.68 In respect of pregnancies with 
FFA, he noted the „appalling prospect of having to carry a fatally doomed foetus to term, 
irrespective of such associated physical risks.‟69 Where pregnancy was the product of 
rape, he noted „the additional burden and torment of being expected to carry to birth and 
thereafter to live with a baby‟70 and noted that „this is a situation where the law should 
protect the abused woman, not perpetuate her suffering.‟71 He also noted that the most 
typical cases of pregnancies due to incest involved „exploitative relationships with young 
or younger female relatives‟72 and that „the agony of having to carry a child to birth, and 
to have a potential responsibility for, and lifelong relationship with, the child thereafter, 
against the mother‟s will, cannot be justified.‟73 Lady Hale made similar observations.74 
It is particularly noteworthy that Lady Hale cited a report from the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)75 as authority that the suffering 
imposed by Northern Ireland‟s law constituted a breach of the right to privacy,76 but 
neglected to note that the exact same report stated that the law also constituted a 
violation of the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.77 It is therefore 
clear that the UKSCt was well-aware of the suffering imposed by Northern Ireland‟s 
abortion legislation, but neglected to engage with this issue. It is particularly noteworthy 
that the UKSCt did not refer to the ECtHR‟s well-established position that psychological 
distress and denial of medical treatment can lead to a violation of Article 3 ,76 as well as 
the case-law analysed in section C below which takes into account the vulnerability of 
the applicant when assessing a violation of Article 3. It would have been prudent to also 
consider relevant international law jurisprudence on the prohibition of inhuman and 
degrading treatment, a point which will be returned to in Section IV. Thus, by neglecting 
to engage with the effect Northern Ireland‟s abortion legislation has on women in the 
circumstances before the Court, by ignoring relevant jurisprudence, and by failing to 
                                                                                                                                                          
65
 Para 127. 
66
 Para 127. 
67
 Para 126. 
68
 Lord Mance, paras 85-90. 
69
 Para 123. 
70
 Para 127. 
71
 Para 127. 
72
 Para 132. 
73
 Para 132. 
74
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75
 Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Art 8 
of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
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76
 Para 27. 
77
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provide reasons why the Article 3  threshold was not triggered, the majority‟s decision in 
respect of Article 3  leaves much to be desired.  
 
B.  Setting the Threshold too High: Defining ‘Legally Significant’ Number 
 
As aforementioned, some judges found that Article 3 was not violated because not 
every woman who is denied an abortion in the three situations before the Court would 
suffer a violation of Article 3  ECHR. We argue that this reasoning sets the numerical 
threshold too high. In the words of Lord Mance (in relation to Article 8), it is unnecessary 
„to show that a law or rule will operate incompatibly in all or most cases. It must be 
sufficient that it will inevitably operate incompatibility in a legally significant number of 
cases‟ (emphasis added).78 It is curious why Lord Mance did not apply the same 
reasoning in respect of Article 3. We prefer the approach of Lord Kerr (with whom Lord 
Wilson agreed), who noted that previous ECtHR jurisprudence focused on whether 
there is a „real risk‟ of suffering treatment prohibited by Article 3.79 As illustrated in 
section II above, there is clearly a real risk that Northern Ireland‟s ban on abortion in 
circumstances of rape, FFA, and incest violates Article 3 ECHR.  
 
C. Failure to Acknowledge the Broadening Case-Law of the Court 
 
To date, Article 3 challenges to restrictive abortion frameworks have only been 
successful in two cases before the ECtHR - RR v Poland (2011)67 and P and S v Poland 
(2012).80 RR v Poland concerned a woman whose fetus had a serious abnormality but 
was repeatedly denied genetic testing to confirm the diagnosis. By the time a diagnosis 
of fetal abnormality was confirmed, it was too late to obtain a legal abortion. P and S v 
Poland concerned a minor who became pregnant as a result of rape. She was severely 
mistreated at the hands of healthcare professionals, who tried to deny her access to an 
abortion. They also publicised her case to the media which lead to harassment from a 
priest and anti-abortion campaigners. Eventually, she had an abortion which in her view 
was done in a „clandestine manner despite the abortion being lawful‟.81 In both cases, 
the ECtHR found a violation of, inter alia, Article 3.  
 
Lord Mance distinguished these cases from the one before the UKSCt on the 
basis that, inter alia, the cases before the ECtHR involved circumstances where the 
applicants were legally entitled to an abortion, but abortion was inaccessible in 
practice.82 In doing so, he implied that the ECtHR would be not be willing to find a 
                                                
78
 Para 74. 
79
 Para 91. 
80
 P and S v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012). 
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 RR v Poland App no 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011). 
82
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breach of Article 3  in jurisdictions such as Northern Ireland where there was no legal 
right to abortion in the circumstances before the UKSCt. Consequently, he found that 
Northern Ireland‟s near-total ban on abortion did not violate Article 3 ECHR.  
 
In our view, the legality (or illegality) of abortion is an irrelevant legal 
consideration in Article 3  proceedings, and thus Lord Mance erred in distinguishing P 
and S and RR from the case at hand. Although the ECtHR may have found it politically 
less risky to find Poland‟s laws in violation of the ECHR, it is significant that the ECtHR 
did not focus on the legality of abortion within Poland. Rather, the crucial factor in the 
ECtHR‟s reasoning in both cases was that the applicants were in situations of great 
vulnerability.83 In P and S, the ECtHR stated the „cardinal importance‟ of the fact the 
applicant was only 14, her pregnancy was a result of rape, she was in a position of 
„great vulnerability‟, and that there was no proper regard to her „vulnerability and young 
age and her own views and feelings‟.84 In RR, the ECtHR noted that the applicant: „like 
any other pregnant woman in her situation, was deeply distressed by information that 
the foetus could be affected with some malformation.‟85 Moreover, the ECtHR described 
RR‟s suffering as „aggravated‟ by the fact that she was legally entitled to such 
diagnostic tests as a matter of domestic law in the State.86 This indicates that the 
legality of abortion access was not the sole or necessary factor for proving a violation of 
Article 3. Thus, in both cases, the fact that abortion was legally provided for within 
Poland was ostensibly not a legal precondition for finding a violation of Article 3. 
 
We therefore argue that Lord Mance‟s focus on the legality (or lack thereof) of 
abortion access in Northern Ireland was misplaced. As stated by Lord Kerr (with whom 
Lord Wilson agreed): 
 
It cannot be correct […] that the breach of article 3 in RR‟s case depended on 
the existence of her right to an abortion. The focus of article 3 is on the 
impact on the person affected by the ill-treatment alleged, not on the reasons 
which underlie it.87 
 
We argue that this approach is preferable, as it fits doctrinally with the absolute 
nature of Article 3. In fact, we argue that the lack of legally available abortion services in 
the circumstances before the court if anything strengthens any claim under Article 3. 
                                                
83
 The use of the concept of vulnerability is not without its problems. However, a detailed discussion is 
outside of the scope of this paper. See L Peroni and A Timmer, „Vulnerable groups: The promise of an 
emerging concept in European Human Rights Convention Law‟ (2013) 11(4) International Journal of 
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When a woman is denied an abortion, her suffering is made no more tolerable to her in 
the knowledge that the denial conformed with domestic law. Moreover, the 
criminalization of abortion stigmatizes a woman‟s actions and person, serving as a 
separate source of severe emotional pain.88 We strongly encourage a future court to 
adopt this approach and find the Northern Irish framework in violation of Article 3 for 
denial of abortion in cases of FFA or rape. 
 
D.  Incorrectly Taking into Account the Purpose of the Legislation 
 
In finding that Northern Ireland‟s abortion laws did not violate Article 3 ECHR, Lord 
Mance referred to the purposes underlying the relevant legislation by noting that the 
suffering of women was the result of laws which originate „in moral beliefs about the 
need to value and protect an unborn foetus‟.89 Although such considerations may be 
relevant in respect of Article 8 when determining whether legislation is for a democratic 
purpose, they should not be taken into account when assessing whether Article 3 – an 
absolute right – has been violated. As correctly stated by Lord Kerr (with whom Lord 
Wilson agreed), the effect of the law: 
 
[…] must be independently examined for its potential to qualify as treatment 
forbidden by article 3. If it is found to reach that standard, it cannot be 
diminished or rescued from the status of article 3 ill-treatment by what might 
be said to be laudable motives or objectives.90  
 
Lord Mance therefore erred in taking the motivations behind Northern Ireland‟s 
abortion law into account. 
 
E.  The Possibility of Travelling Elsewhere to Avail of Abortion Services Does not 
Mean that Article 3 is Not Breached 
 
The majority was willing to find that there was no breach of Article 3 because women 
wishing to terminate their pregnancies could do so by travelling elsewhere. However, 
when discussing Article 8 , Lady Hale noted that „relying on the possibility that [a 
woman] may be able to summon up the resources, mental and financial, to travel to 
Great Britain for an abortion if anything makes matters worse rather than better.‟91 Once 
again, it is questionable why this was deemed a relevant factor only in respect of Article 
                                                
88
 Human Rights Committee, Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland, 9 June 2016, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013, para 5.4. 
89
 Para 100. 
90
 Para 255. 
91
 Para 27. 
   
 
   
 
17 
8. It would have been preferable had the majority explained why they were not applying 
the same considerations to both Article 8 and Article 3 in this context.  
 
F. Lack of Rigorous Analyisis 
 
A final criticism that joins together all the points made above is the fact that the judges 
paid little, if any, attention to Article 3. The brevity of the UKSC‟s discussion of Article 3 
is particularly disappointing given the ECtHR‟s long-held position that: 
 
the existence of a risk of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 […] must 
necessarily be a rigorous one in view of the absolute character of this 
provision and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the 
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.92 
 
It is argued that in future cases, the court should at the very least, engage in 
rigorous analysis of Article 3 even if it is unwilling to find a violation in this respect. 
 
 
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
In the opening paragraphs of her judgment, Lady Hale appropriately noted that the 
ECHR has to be interpreted in light of other international treaties to which the UK is a 
party. Similarly, Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed) stated that: 
 
[…] although the traditional and orthodox view is that courts do not apply 
unincorporated international treaties […] such treaties may be relevant in a 
number of ways […] namely, where the court is applying the ECHR via the 
HRA.93  
 
The views of these justices reflect the well-established international law rule that 
treaty interpretation must take account of „any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties‟.94 This rule is frequently invoked by the 
ECtHR, which regularly draws upon international law to interpret the ECHR.141 
However, very little reference was made to international law in this case, despite the 
aforementioned Justices‟ laudable intentions.  
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The judges had a wealth of treaties to draw upon – six in fact – which set out rights 
that are relevant in the abortion context.95 All of these treaties are binding on the UK, 
and thus „must be performed in good faith‟.96 In addition, Article27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that domestic law is no defence for 
failing to comply with international obligations. 97 Although these treaties are binding at 
the international – rather than the domestic – level,98 the judges could have nonetheless 
drawn on them as a source of persuasive authority when interpreting the ECHR. 
 
The most relevant treaty to the facts at hand was the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), yet it received scant attention in the judgment.99 
The ICCPR qualifies as a „relevant rule of international law‟100 that informs the 
interpretation of the ECHR because ICCPR and the ECHR both protect rights that are 
primarily civil and political in nature, and they are inspired by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as well as ideals of peace, freedom, and justice.101 Indeed, the ECtHR 
has also been more receptive to the ICCPR than to any other treaty in its decisions.102 
Of particular importance to the case at hand is the ICCPR‟s monitoring body, the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), which has delivered its views on the compatibility of 
strict abortion regimes with the ICCPR. Although Lord Mance stated that the HRC‟s 
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views are   „not authorities as to the position under the ECHR‟103 we argue that the 
views of the HRC are persuasive (albeit non-binding) because the HRC has been 
mandated to provide „authoritative‟104 and „determinative‟105 interpretations of the 
ICCPR;106 and members of the HRC are persons of high moral character and 
recognized competence in the field of human rights.107 Most, if not all of them, are 
experts in international law, and thus their views are a subsidiary source of international 
law.108 Finally, the ECtHR has frequently relied upon the views of the HRC in 
interpreting the ECHR.109  
 
Two recent complaints before the HRC dealt with similar circumstances to those 
before the UKSCt, and thus should have been engaged with by the UKSCt.110 The 
complaints of Mellet v Ireland (June 2016)111 and Whelan v Ireland (June 2017)112 both 
concerned women who were carrying fetuses with a fatal abnormality. Similar to 
Northern Ireland, Irish law does not provide for abortion in cases of fatal fetal 
abnormality.113 The women thus had to travel to the UK for a termination, but they were 
not provided with information on accessing abortion services in the UK and faced 
significant financial and practical travelling difficulties. They both had to leave the fetal 
remains in the UK which were subsequently delivered to them. Neither woman received 
any support upon returning to Ireland while suffering from complicated grief and feelings 
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of isolation. In respect of both women, the HRC found that Ireland violated Arts 7,114 
17,115 and 26 of the ICCPR.116 Our focus is on the Article7 claim, because Article7 
mirrors the wording of Article 3 ECHR. We argue that the UKSCt should have taken the 
views of the HRC into account because of (i) their persuasive authority, as outlined 
above; and (ii) the fact that the HRC dealt with abortion and FFA, which was an issue 
before the UKSCt. 
 
Lord Mance succinctly distinguished the views of the HRC in Mellet and Whelan 
from the case before the UKSCt on the basis that alleged ill- treatment must reach a 
significant severity before it triggers Article 3.117 In doing so, he implied that treatment 
does not need to be of a significant severity before falling under Article7 of the ICCPR 
and thus the HRC‟s views on Article 7 were irrelevant. We respectfully disagree with this 
interpretation. The HRC engaged in a detailed analysis of the conditions facing both 
complainants which shows that, like the ECtHR, the HRC carefully scrutinises the facts 
at hand to determine whether there has been a breach of Article 7. Indeed, Lord Mance 
accepted in his judgment that they „focus intensely on the particular facts‟.118 The HRC 
held that the complainants‟ physical and mental anguish had been exacerbated by: (i) 
not being able to continue receiving medical care and health insurance coverage for 
treatment from the Irish health care system; (ii) the need to choose between continuing 
a non-viable pregnancy or travelling to another country while carrying a dying fetus, at 
personal expense and separated from family support, and to return while not fully 
recovered; (iii) the shame and stigma associated with the criminalization of abortion of a 
fatally ill fetus; (iv) the fact of having to leave the fetus‟ remains behind; and (v) the 
State‟s refusal to provide necessary and appropriate post-abortion and bereavement 
care. The HRC found that many of these experiences could have been avoided if the 
complainants had not been prohibited from terminating their pregnancies in the familiar 
environment of their own State. It considered that the complainants‟ suffering was 
further aggravated by the obstacles faced in receiving needed information about 
appropriate medical options from known and trusted medical providers. Thus, the HRC 
engaged in a close scrutiny of whether the circumstances met the Article 7 threshold. 
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This is very similar to the approach taken by the ECtHR in interpreting Article 3 of the 
ECHR. Therefore, we argue that the HRC and ECtHR‟s approach can be readily 
compared, and the HRC‟s views should have been considered in the UKSCt‟s decision. 
 
As a final note, it should be stated that the UKSCt‟s treatment of international law is 
not wholly without merit. The UKSCt is to be commended for correctly identifying that 
there is no consensus in international law over whether there is a right to an abortion in 
cases of serious fetal abnormality. As noted by Lady Hale and Lord Kerr (with whom 
Lord Wilson agreed), although the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women has recommended to the UK to legalise abortion „at least‟ where there 
is a threat to the pregnant woman‟s physical or mental health; rape or incest; and 
severe foetal impairment, including FFA;119 it has reconciled its views with that of the 
UN Committee on the Right of Persons with Disabilities that this should be done „without 
perpetuating stereotypes towards persons with disabilities and ensuring appropriate and 
ongoing support, social and financial, for women who decide to carry such pregnancies 
to term.‟120 Consequently we argue that in finding that Article 3 did not provide a right to 
abortion in cases of serious fetal abnormality, the UKSCt appropriately aligned itself 
with international law. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
Many aspects of the UKSCt decision are to be welcomed. It is the first case to consider 
substantive laws on abortion in Northern Ireland, and to make a finding, albeit in obiter 
terms, that Northern Irish law in so far as it prohibits abortion in cases of rape, incest 
and fatal fetal abnormality is a violation of Article 8 ECHR. Some judges were also 
willing to find violations of a breach of Article 3 in respect of the same circumstances. 
When read alongside the recent developments such as the Irish referendum repealing 
its constitutional ban on abortion,121 a report from the UN CEDAW Committee 
determining that Northern Ireland‟s current law on abortion leads to grave and 
systematic violations of international human rights law,122 and the debate on 
                                                
119
 Para 133. 
120
 Para 133. 
121
 For a discussion of this referendum see: A McMahon and B Ní Ghráinne, „After the Eighth: Ireland, 
Abortion and International Law‟ available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3256317  
122
 Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Art 8 
of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1 available at 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fOP.
8%2fGBR%2f1&Lang=en  
   
 
   
 
22 
decriminalization of abortion in Westminster, it adds to the wider political landscape of 
mounting pressure calling for reform of this area of law.123 Indeed, the UKSCt‟s 
encouragement of future litigation is likely to lead to a declaration that Northern Ireland‟s 
law is incompatible with the ECHR. This will put further pressure on the Northern Irish 
Assembly to enact legislative change.  
 
We argue that the UKSCt‟s finding in respect of Article 8 ECHR was appropriate. 
Nonetheless, in considering future challenges, courts should be encouraged to engage 
more deeply with Article 3 ECHR and refer to relevant international law. A violation 
under Article 3 is one of the severest violations within human rights law and would send 
a clear message to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the UK government on the need 
to amend the existing framework. Finding a breach of Article 3 alongside Article 8 
ECHR would be a direct acknowledgement of women‟s suffering in this context, would 
provide a truer reflection of the level of incompatibility that exists between Northern Irish 
law and international law and practically, would add to the mounting pressure on 
Northern Ireland to change its laws.  
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